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Development of the Croatian National 




The development of the new National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Republic of Croatia, begun 
in November 2016, takes place in a radically different security environment compared to the first 
(and current) Croatian NSS published in 2002. This paper aims to provide incentives for potential 
adaptations to the approach and methodology used in Croatia’s NSS development, particularly 
in relation to hybrid warfare. Assuming that the hybrid adversary tends heavily to exploit the 
vulnerabilities of the targeted state and society, the paper addresses some of Croatia’s widely 
recognized weaknesses that should be taken into consideration in a threat assessment. As a 
conclusion, the paper proposes some recommendations, including the concept of societal resilience, 
related to ways to counter hybrid threats.
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Introduction
The first, and current, National Security Strategy (NSS) of the Republic of 
Croatia was endorsed and published in 2002, as “a conceptual document 
in which the Croatian Parliament, as the highest political and legislative 
institution, determines and accepts political views on fundamental national 
security issues” (Croatian Parliament 2002). Since then, a handful of efforts 
have been made (MoD Croatia 2010) to develop a new strategy but none 
of them was finalized with an endorsed document. The latest effort, begun 
in November 2016, calls for “redefining the concept of national security 
and the related institutions” and defining a security system that is in line with 
recent internal and external political and economic changes (HINA 2016). 
The need for a redefinition of the concept of national security and 
related institutions arguably stems from changes in how the very notion 
of security is perceived in Croatia, as well as from the changed security 
environment. The period since the end of the Homeland War2, and the 
2000s in particular, has been marked by relative complacency regarding 
risks related to direct conventional threats against the Republic of 
Croatia. To a great extent, membership of NATO, and of the EU to a lesser 
degree, has represented an important guarantee that Croatian security 
would also be defended by multinational defence capabilities. Most 
importantly, the Alliance’s capacities have provided, and still provide, a 
robust deterrent capability. However, NATO’s military and technological 
superiority has been challenged with the outbreak of the Ukraine crisis 
and the emergence of hybrid threats and concepts, commonly known 
as hybrid warfare. While in terms of political, military and economic 
power, NATO’s superiority has remained unchanged, the new operating 
concepts, clearly recognized in Russian foreign policy behaviour since 
2014, appeared as an unexpected challenge for several NATO members, 
especially those on the Eastern flank. 
Russian politics towards and against Ukraine, especially since 2014, have 
shown that disturbances of the vital societal functions and violation of 
2 According to the Act on the Rights of Croatian Defenders of the Homeland War and Members of their Families (Zakon 
o pravima hrvatskih branitelja iz Domovinskog rata i članova njihovih obitelji), the Croatian Homeland War lasted from 
5 August 1990 until 30 June 1996 (Croatian Parliament 2004).
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the infrastructure capability to perform its functions were among the most 
important instruments of their operating concept. Apparently, the Russian 
objectives were directed at undermining the country’s ability to resist 
the potential aggressor. The Ukrainian example also demonstrated that 
malicious acts against the key societal functions and critical infrastructure 
could become a very powerful tool of the state actor, not only the non-
state actors, as was the case before. Damage to the critical infrastructure 
aimed at deteriorating living conditions may, under favourable conditions, 
force the attacked country to submit to the aggressor, allowing it to 
achieve its political goals. The Ukraine crisis revealed that the time for 
complacency, even for NATO members, is over and that the political 
and military power of the Alliance is being challenged by behaviour 
that sneaks under the threshold of activation of collective defence 
mechanisms (e.g. North Atlantic Treaty Article 5), primarily exploiting state 
and societal vulnerabilities.
Being a complex phenomenon, hybrid warfare and related concepts 
represent the types of threat that require a holistic approach in 
conceptualization, planning, organizing and exercising the response to 
them. The developers of a national security strategy, in designing their 
models, should recognize the paradigmatic changes in the security 
environment and the objects of what should be protected (i.e. secured) 
and how. We also propose use of the systems approach (systems thinking), 
which is useful in handling the complexity that Croatia’s national security 
is facing and will face in the coming period. Systems thinking may help 
in approaching national security holistically, focusing more on reducing 
one’s own vulnerabilities. 
While the traditional elements of state power remain relevant, the smaller 
states, like Croatia, even under the umbrella of NATO or as a member of 
the EU, have to increase their immunity. We argue that, no matter who the 
adversary could be, revisionist or rival state(s), state or non-state actors, 
the most efficient national defence measures should include a reduction 
of societal vulnerabilities. Societal resilience arguably represents one of 
the most efficient ways to prevent hybrid threats from being effective. 
Societal resilience has recently been recognized in many countries 
(Cederberg and Eronen 2015a), as well in NATO and the EU, as the key 
factor for mitigating societal vulnerabilities. 
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Theoretical framework
In the following sections, we analyse the notion of national security and 
the hybrid warfare concept with related terms. After that, we examine 
implications of the hybrid threat environment for Croatia’s national 
security. We also address some of Croatia’s widely recognized weaknesses 
that should be taken into consideration in any key security and defence 
strategy threat assessment. Finally, we propose ways to counter hybrid 
threats, including an expanded approach to strategic planning and the 
concept of societal resilience.
The national security
Alan Stolberg (2012: 12) found that different nations have different 
perspectives on what national security is, which are largely inherent in 
the respective strategic culture of each nation state. Stolberg explains 
that “the combination of national interests with strategic culture, and a 
country’s understanding of what its security concerns should be, leads to 
the identification of what the idea of national security will mean for an 
individual nation-state member of the international system”. Finally, the 
association of the terms “national” and “security” with the concept of 
strategy will give the national security most of its relevance.
According to George Kennan3 (1948), as cited in Ikenberry and Slaughter 
(2006: 14), national security is “the continued ability of the country to 
pursue the development of its internal life without serious interference, or 
threat of interference, from foreign powers.” This kind of perspective was 
very influential, particularly among the real politics scholars, until the end 
of the Cold War period, more precisely until the end of the 1990s. The state 
and its defence from external threats was amongst the highest priorities 
(or “ends”) of most national security strategies at the time. In general, 
3 The definition by George Kennan refers to his Comments on the General Trend of U.S. Foreign Policy, George F. Kennan 
Papers, Princeton University, dated 20 August 1948.
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it may be said that national security strategies substantially represented 
a “nation’s plan for the coordinated use of all the instruments of state 
power—non-military as well as military—to pursue objectives that defend 
and advance its national interest” (Doyle 2007: 624). Arnold Wolfers (1952) 
makes a distinction between security in an “objective sense”, as the 
absence of threats, and in a “subjective sense”, as the absence of fear. 
He argues that security is achieved once both components exist. Some 
scholars in Croatia argue that the most important aspect of national 
security is that it represents a precondition for social and economic 
development (Bilandžić 2015, 2017). 
Besides the state security, national security encompasses functions and 
institutions.4 In general, security institutions have to evolve and to be 
transformed to be able to ensure the state’s function to provide security. 
In the USA, for instance, the most obvious paradigm change related to the 
security apparatus after the Cold War happened with the 11 September 
2001 terrorist attack and the subsequent anthrax mailings on US soil. These 
events changed the United States’ calculus of national interests and led 
to the establishment of the Department of Homeland Security (Newmann 
2002). The changed post-Cold War security environment, with new threats 
and challenges, necessitated an additional focus on internal security, 
consequently involving the crisis management concept. As the threats 
became more challenging, the response model started to evolve from 
the departmental towards the interagency model. 
Threats and challenges recognized recently as “hybrid” represent an 
additional challenge in the approach to national security, expanding it 
to societal (MoD Finland 2010) and human security.
The hybrid warfare concept
Hybrid threats, hybrid operations, hybrid warfare, ambiguous warfare, 
4 The Croatian National Security Strategy 2002 comprises under the term national security of the Republic of Croatia: 
“(1) a certain (achieved or planned) state of security, (2) a functional area of operations for various security institutions 
along with all social efforts in the field of achieving security goals and (3) the actual security institutions, linked together 
within an established relations system” (Croatian Parliament 2002).
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non-linear warfare, shadow war or grey-zone wars5 are just some of the 
recently formulated expressions related to the hybrid warfare topic. In 
the broader literature, the concept of hybrid warfare is often the subject 
of semantic debate. We will employ the term “hybrid” and the ordinary 
warfare-related derivative for convenience, to align with the common 
use of the term. Additionally, without intending to reargue the debate 
existing in open source literature on an adequate name for this topic, 
we will consider it as a concept. Namely, as the recently finished NATO 
STO’s (2017: 2) research SAS-127 Hybrid warfare: a case study, NATO 
implications suggests, hybrid warfare can be seen as “a concept of 
operations, or perhaps, an operational concept, rather than a strategy 
or a theory of warfare.” We also adopt the term “hybrid adversary” for 
an actor applying the hybrid warfare concept and “hybrid threats” as 
potential actors and trends that exist in the security environment before 
the hybrid warfare concept is applied (which is more an act).
We dedicate the following sections to discussing some important questions 
related to the hybrid warfare concept.
Does the hybrid warfare concept represent a new type of 
warfare?
Contrary to some claims (Barno 2013, 2014; Cederberg and Eronen 2015b), 
so-called Russian hybrid warfare does not seem to represent anything 
new or revolutionary in the history of warfare. Most of the elements, such 
as the use of “fronts” or proxies, were present in earlier conflicts, even 
during the Cold War (Mansoor 2012; NATO STO 2017). What has been 
recognized as new, however, is the use of digital media for information 
operations at local, regional and even international levels. Janis Berzins 
(2014: 5), for instance, argues that, from the Russian perspective, “the 
main battle-space is the mind and, as a result, new-generation wars 
are to be dominated by information and psychological  warfare.” This 
approach intends to create a sense of moral and psychological pressure 
on enemy’s armed forces personnel and civil population. In that context, 
5 Antulio Echevarria analyses the Ukraine conflict and concludes that Russia exploited the ambiguity to accomplish 
its objectives outside the normal scope of what military strategists and campaign planners are legally authorized 
or professionally trained to address. However, he claims that the grey-zone wars are not wars, per se, “as much as 
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information may be disseminated by means of television stations, websites/
web portals or social media groups and may even include leafleting to 
the home address.
Another characteristic that represents novelty is the coordinated use of all 
instruments of state power at low levels, which also accounts for a general 
improvement. In the case of Russia, the instruments of state power have 
been used comprehensively, focusing on different domains, sequentially 
or at the same time.
What is the role of Russia in relation to the hybrid warfare 
concept?
Hybrid warfare does not exist as an institutionalized concept in either 
Russia or the West. We adopt the thesis that hybrid warfare is not a Russian-
generated theory of warfare and it is worth mentioning that Russian 
decision-makers claim that they adapted their capabilities to Western 
behaviour in international relations (Gerasimov 2013; Bartles 2016). 
Even though a discernible pattern of its characteristics exist, the hybrid 
warfare concept should rather be seen as a set of principles, methods 
and tools, prioritized and, when possible, integrated, skilfully applied to 
achieve political objectives without escalating into armed conflict. We 
argue that our (i.e. Western) struggle to describe the hybrid warfare 
concept lies in the fact that Russian foreign policy behaviour since 2014 
represents a certain strategic surprise to our legal norms and capabilities. 
This surprise also stems from a complacency in our (i.e. the Euro-Atlantic 
region) economic and military power which, arguably, has not had the 
desired deterrent effect.
Therefore, when we talk about the hybrid warfare concept, we must be 
tolerant and willing to cope with a very fluid, changing and transformative 
theme. The concept, of course, challenges our judgement and perception 
and should not be underestimated just because, once emerged, it 
looks similar to what we have seen before. It is particularly important to 
approach assessment of the hybrid warfare threat properly in the national 
security strategy as it has a profound impact on ways (usually the need 
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for an integrated, whole of the government approach) and means (that 
also go beyond the purely military but affect armed forces in terms of 
their agility, responsiveness and level of integration with other instruments 
of state power).
To properly approach the hybrid warfare concept, it is extremely important 
to assess a threat actor within that actor’s own context. To this end, it is 
critical that the analysis of hybrid warfare’s characteristics in the context 
of the Russo-Ukraine conflict and Russia’s foreign policy behaviour in 
general is grounded on a deep understanding of the historical context 
(NATO STO 2017).
Nevertheless, a strategic foresight analysis, which is a part of NSS 
development, must consider hybrid warfare in a more general perspective. 
A good example of this is the report by the Center for Strategic and 
International Studies (Conley et al. 2016) which provides key findings on 
Russia’s influence in Central and Eastern Europe. Their findings may be 
used as the basic elements to describe Russia’s foreign policy behaviour 
related to the use of hybrid warfare methods.
• “Russia has cultivated an opaque network of patronage across the 
region that it uses to influence and direct decision-making”, a web 
that “resembles a network flow model”, which the authors call an 
“unvirtuous cycle of the Russian influence”.
• “Corruption is the lubricant […] concentrating on the exploitation of 
state resources to further Russia’s networks of influence”.
• The networks constitute the vital element of Russia’s doctrine which 
is primarily a “strategy of influence, not of brute force,” aimed at 
“breaking the internal coherence of the enemy system—and not 
about its integral annihilation” (Conley et al. 2016: X).
Obviously, the methods described above focus primarily on societal 
vulnerabilities (e.g. governance, internal conflicts, socially divided society, 
lack of political consensus on the future of the society, corruption, inefficient 
law enforcement, lack of natural resources and energy dependency on 
foreign states, etc.). This aspect seems to be the most important element 
in distinguishing this type of warfare from the more traditional, where 
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a territory and a battle (i.e. war fighting) are the main paradigm. The 
Ukraine crisis therefore brought a new dimension to understanding the 
hybrid warfare concept: during the crisis, the non-coercive dimension of 
the concept emerged as preponderant while the hard (kinetic) power 
(i.e. armed forces) was used primarily as a means of threat.
It has to be emphasized that Russia is not the only actor in contemporary 
international relations that uses hybrid warfare methods. Similar examples, 
to a certain extent, may be seen in China’s behaviour in the South China 
Sea or ISIL’s ability to mobilize people with a fractured identity. However, 
Russian foreign policy behaviour comprises most of what the broadest 
understanding of the hybrid warfare concept contains.
How to define the hybrid warfare concept?
Even though we agree that any attempt to create a strict definition of 
hybrid warfare may create a risk of not encompassing it comprehensively, 
doing that is still useful, at least to ensure that the concept is comprehended 
beyond its purely military or defence dimension.
The NATO STO (2017) Research Specialist Team6 (RST) determined that 
there was little value in looking at the definition of hybrid warfare as part 
of its work. The RST rather decided that the greatest value would come 
from focusing on understanding the modalities of Russian and Russian-
sponsored activities against Ukraine. 
The fact is that the definitions and our understanding of the concept evolve 
as we reveal its characteristics. Before the Ukraine crisis, hybrid warfare was 
mostly described as conflict comprising a combination of conventional 
and asymmetric means of violence. This approach apparently did not 
go beyond the tactical and operational perspective, let alone include 
society and its economy, critical infrastructure and other instruments of 
the state power. Peter R. Mansoor describes hybrid warfare as “conflict 
involving military forces and irregulars (guerrillas, insurgents and terrorists), 
which could include both state and non-state actors aimed at achieving 
a common political goal” (Mansoor 2012: 2). The primary trigger for a 
6  The RST comprised researchers from nine NATO and partners’ nations and the research was conducted in partnership 
with the Ukraine National Institute for Strategic Studies (NISS).
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renewed discussion on the character of this concept was actually Russia’s 
engagement in the Ukraine crisis (Giles et al. 2015). 
In 2010, NATO developed the document Bi-SC input to a new NATO 
capstone concept for the military contribution to countering hybrid 
threats. The document aimed to articulate the parameters of hybrid 
threats facing NATO and recognize areas that might determine the 
future capability development in NATO. The intention was also to inform 
higher-level political authorities and lower-level military commanders 
of the potential implications within their own domains. The document 
defines hybrid threats as “those posed by adversaries, with the ability 
to simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means 
adaptively in pursuit of their objectives” (NATO 2010: 2). 
The perception of hybrid warfare’s definition evolved over time and was 
mainly understood as being applied by “any adversary that simultaneously 
employs a tailored mix of conventional weapons, irregular tactics, 
terrorism, and criminal behaviour at the same time and battlespace to 
obtain their political objectives” (Hoffman 2014).
The EU has developed several policy documents that describe hybrid 
threats, initially to support its Stratcom and EU Military Staff (MS), and later 
to provide for the Joint Framework on countering hybrid threats. Some of 
the definitions are: 
“Hybrid warfare can be more easily characterized than defined 
as a centrally designed and controlled use of various covert and 
overt tactics, enacted by military and/or non-military means, 
ranging from intelligence and cyber operations through economic 
pressure to the use of conventional forces. By employing hybrid 
tactics, the attacker seeks to undermine and destabilize an 
opponent by applying both coercive and subversive methods” 
(EEAS 2015: 2).
“Hybrid threats can be characterized as a mixture of coercive and 
subversive activity, conventional and unconventional methods 
(i.e. diplomatic, military, economic, technological, information), 
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which can be used in a coordinated manner by state or non-state 
actors to achieve specific objectives while remaining below the 
threshold of open organized hostilities. There is usually an emphasis 
on exploiting the vulnerabilities of the target and on generating 
ambiguity with the intention to hinder decision-making processes. 
Massive disinformation campaigns, using social media to control 
the political narrative or to radicalize, recruit and direct proxy 
actors can be vehicles for hybrid threats” (EC 2016: 4). 
Definitions of the hybrid warfare concept related to the Ukraine crisis are 
not the only ones that exist. One of the most comprehensive descriptions of 
such warfare in the age of globalization was made by two Chinese senior 
colonels, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, in 1999. Their main argument was 
that warfare in the modern world would no longer be primarily a struggle 
defined by military means; even more, it may not involve the military at 
all. Liang and Xiangsui (1999: 7) acknowledged the new principles of war 
that were no longer about “using armed force to compel the enemy to 
submit to one’s will” but rather were “using all means, including armed 
force or non-armed force, military and non-military, and lethal and non-
lethal means to compel the enemy to accept one’s interests”.
The concept labelled as hybrid warfare is therefore neither entirely 
new nor as old or known as some authors claim. However, many of 
the existing definitions, especially those articulated before 2014, lack 
comprehensiveness that goes beyond the military domain (i.e. beyond 
an attempt to describe it as warfare).
Implications of hybrid threat context for Croatia’s 
national security
Arguably, hybrid warfare methods are a reality and are in use by 
adversaries in shaping the contemporary security environment. From 
the NATO members’ perspective, they are closely connected to Russian 
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foreign policy behaviour (NATO 2016).7 Consequently, the question worth 
answering is how does the fact that hybrid warfare is a reality affects 
Croatia’s national security?
Croatia’s regional security environment and the role 
of Russia
Although we are not able to produce a reliable intelligence report related 
to potential or specific activities of Russia against the Republic of Croatia, 
some information from open sources may help to create a relatively 
sound perspective on it. 
In an interview with Defense News (Judson 2016), during the Halifax 
National Security Forum, the Croatian President Mrs Kolinda Grabar 
Kitarović expressed her views on current threats in Croatia’s immediate 
neighbourhood, explicitly labelling Russian involvement:
“Russia has been very much in hybrid warfare [...] and we 
see these strong connections between [Republic of Srpska‘s 
president Milorad] Dodik and Russia [...] that there would be 
Russian interference through weapons, through tactics, through 
intelligence, through information and disinformation campaign.”
Apparently, Croatia is not perceived by its highest political levels, at least 
officially, as a target itself but is rather seen as part of a bigger puzzle in 
which regional instability may have significant implications for Croatia’s 
national security. We assume that it is reasonable to believe that the main 
issues in relations between the West and Russia are not only developments 
in Ukraine but lie in “the international status and socio-political system of 
Russia” (Kreutz 2015: 67). The Russian President Putin often stresses that 
his country has no aspirations to global leadership and does not want to 
follow the Soviet example to represent a kind of “saviour to the world”. One 
7 NATO’s Warsaw Summit communiqué (para. 5) explicitly describes hybrid attacks as one of the security challenges for 
the Alliance. Furthermore, it recognizes Russia’s aggressive actions and its demonstrated willingness to attain political 
goals by the threat and use of force as “a source of regional instability [that] fundamentally challenge the Alliance, 
have damaged Euro-Atlantic security, and threaten our long-standing goal of a Europe whole, free, and at peace.”
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example is his speech at the plenary meeting of the Valdai International 
Discussion Club in October 2014: 
“We do not have any claims to world leadership. The idea that 
Russia is seeking some sort of exclusivity is false [...] we are simply 
proceeding from the premise that all participants in international 
relations should respect each other’s interests” (President of Russia 
2014).
On the other hand, it is evident that Russia positions itself as a Eurasian 
power, trying to increase its influence in the regions of North Africa and 
Middle Asia, and intends to block the enlargement of NATO and EU to its 
“near abroad”. It is therefore reasonable to expect that Russia’s primary 
interests lie in countries like Belarus, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan and, 
apparently, Ukraine. 
Russia’s far reaching agenda of “corralling as many former vassals as 
possible” (Besemeres 2016: 15) back into its sphere of influence through 
coercive means has become more evident since Mr Vladimir Putin 
returned to the presidency in 2012. On the other hand, Russia is aware 
of its weaknesses in terms of power and capabilities compared to the 
West and is not expected to deteriorate relations with it to escalate 
these relations militarily. On the contrary, Russia may and does focus on 
destabilizing the unity of NATO and the EU.
Although the countries in Eastern, Central and North Europe expressed 
their concerns and worries about Russian foreign policy behaviour after 
2014 more loudly,8 the region of South-Eastern Europe and the Western 
Balkans, in particular, is even more susceptible to Russian influence. Some 
politicians in that area of Europe openly warned about Russian objectives 
and the need for NATO to respond more forcefully. One example is the 
views expressed by the former Bulgarian President Mr. Pleveneliev, who 
demanded that the EU and NATO do more to respond to the Russian 
“hybrid warfare” approach and to counter the rising threat of Russian 
aggression (Holmes 2015). Recent events in Macedonia where, according 
to Janusz Bugajski (2017), the Russian’s goal is “not only to diminish 
prospects for Macedonia’s entry into NATO and the EU, but even more 
8 The direct result of that is NATO’s Readiness Action Plan which, among other things, comprises “assurance measures” 
for NATO member countries in Central and Eastern Europe (NATO 2017).
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menacingly to turn the Balkans into a conflict zone that illustrates Western 
weakness and intensifies Russia’s influence”, might be a good example 
of that influence in place. The case of Macedonia is just an extension of 
the influence Russia already has in place in Serbia and Republika Srpska 
(Kirillova 2017). 
Current developments in the Western Balkans show a growing trajectory 
of instability. Unfortunately, the EU has lacked an enlargement strategy for 
Western Balkan countries since 2007. Nevertheless, the EU is still believed 
to be a major factor in the regional stability. This is confirmed by Mr Jean 
Claude Juncker’s blunt warning to Donald Trump (Barber 2017) against 
encouraging countries to copy Brexit, arguing that a break-up of the EU 
could trigger a war in the Western Balkans.
A more subtle way of influencing political and economic dynamics in 
the region is the financial domain, where the fragility of banking systems 
may be used for bargaining via pressures (e.g. threatening to pull large 
deposits), controlled crisis, etc. As argued by Ivan Krastev (2015), the 
Financial Times journalist, the banking systems in the region are fragile and 
a controlled crisis in the Balkans would give Russia bargaining chips, and 
deniability.
A generalized assessment of strengths, weaknesses, 
opportunities and threats (SWOT analysis) of the 
Republic of Croatia
One of the conclusions of NATO STO’s (2017) activity SAS-127 Hybrid 
warfare: a case study, NATO implications was that it is imperative to 
understand ourselves, since every weakness and vulnerability may be 
exploited. The results of the analysis that follows represent a generalized 
and illustrative assessment of the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities 
and threats (SWOT analysis) of the Republic of Croatia related to its 
national security. A particular emphasis in this assessment was given to 
societal vulnerabilities in Croatia that are usually not taken seriously into 
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consideration during the development of a threat assessment.
Strengths 
• Membership of NATO and EU
• Relatively high level of national cohesion (no ethnic/separatists, 
extremists or other tensions)
• Capable armed forces and law enforcement system
Weaknesses 
• Lack of appropriate interagency (inter-sectorial) cooperation at 
national level (including crisis management) 
• Lack of legal and political means for addressing hybrid warfare 
• Armed forces entirely dependent on professionals (reserve forces 
not adequately maintained for force augmentation in terms of 
personnel and capability) 
• Inadequate and insufficient legal and doctrinal basis to counter 
hybrid strategies
• Negative demographic trends (ageing, depopulation, emigration of 
the active working population of Croatia to other, more prosperous 
EU countries) 
• Low national economic performance9 resulting in growing social 
inequalities
• Unsustainable public finances, including excessive dependence of 
the population on state transfers, which consequently exaggerate 
government spending (Buric and Stulhofer 2016; Lausic 2017)
• Low effectiveness of the legal system10
• Political clientelism (crony capitalism) and systemic political 
corruption (Bilandžić 2015)
9 The Bloomberg prediction “Meet 2016’s Worst Economic Performers”, puts Croatia in a group of the ten worst 
performing economies in 2016 (Tartar et al. 2016). The fact that Japan, Finland and Switzerland are in the same group 
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• High level of energy import dependency11
• Irrationality of territorial organization and hypertrophy of state 
institutions and agencies
Opportunities
• Existing national consensus (political parties in the Parliament) about 
the need to develop a comprehensive government approach to 
national security
• Besides countries in transition, the Croatian neighbourhood consists 
of consolidated democracies
Threats (Challenges)
• Clash of geopolitical interests of the outer states in the Western 
Balkans, with a potential spill-over12 of conflict over the borders
• Negative security trends in the neighbourhood (potential for 
violent extremism/radicalism, organized crime, illegal/uncontrolled 
migrations, possible terrorism)
• Political and societal tensions in the neighbourhood (Serbia, Bosnia 
and Herzegovina): weak states, unfinished processes of political 
and economic transition
The above assessment shows that, aside from external conditions (the 
global and regional security environment), Croatia’s internal challenges 
also give cause for concern. Although NATO membership provides an 
essential deterrent capability against conventional threats, NATO’s 
Warsaw Summit Declaration states that “the primary responsibility to 
respond to hybrid threats or attacks rests with the targeted nation” 
(NATO 2016: para.72). However, the Declaration promises that “NATO is 
prepared to assist an Ally at any stage of a hybrid campaign”. The hybrid 
threats and attacks apparently do not fit automatically under NATO’s 
collective defence umbrella. This kind of uncertainty has led many small 
11 Croatia imports 72 per cent of its energy consumption; most of it (91 per cent) refers to fossil fuels (Matutinovic 2014).
12 NATO uses this term in describing the strategic military perspectives, including the impact of geopolitical trends on 
security environment, referring to “Spill over of conflict from neighbouring countries along NATO borders, interstate 
conflict over access to resources, state-on-state conflict including Article V situations, resource wars, frozen conflict, 
new spheres of influence” (NATO ACT 2015: 15).
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NATO countries, particularly those at the northern and southern “vignette” 
of the European continent, closer to Russia geographically, to put an 
additional focus on deterrence measures. The issue is, and it is generally 
acknowledged, that neither all adversaries nor all types of threat may be 
deterred by employing traditional deterrence strategies. This is particularly 
the case with non-state actors (Clarke, Gearson and Shaud 2009: 295–
297). Deterrence depends upon psychological effects and must fulfil 
three criteria: capability, commitment and communication (Lonsdale 
2008: 50). Considering Russia as a potential threat, some Scandinavian 
countries (e.g. Norway, Sweden and Finland), joined by Estonia, started 
developing the threshold concept, which is conceptualized under the 
premise of denying the aggressor the ability to achieve its goals swiftly 
and at low cost (i.e. before NATO’s Article V has been activated). In a 
multinational alliance context, the threshold is considered the deterrence 
which the national armed forces in place provide. In this view, the sum of 
the allied forces provides the deterrence while the national forces provide 
the threshold. The threshold concept and deterrence arguably deserve 
an independent study, and are currently the topic of the NATO Science 
and Technology Organization project SAS-131 The threshold concept for 
and by smaller forces. Besides capable and relevant armed forces, it is 
very important to identify and assess the vital functions of the society, 
safeguarding and building resilience in them. Resilience in that case works 
as a means of dissuading the deterred from aggression, since the costs 
for the aggressor of creating harm increase with the straightforwardness 
of security measures used to protect the essentials of the society of the 
deterrer.
Ways to counter hybrid threats
The organization of a robust national defence to cope with hybrid threats 
requires a different approach from the current traditional one to deal 
with more or less conventional and asymmetric threats that comprise 
an armed attack or/and armed conflict. The instabilities in which hybrid 
warfare principles are implemented show the inadequacy of the military 
as a particular instrument of national power able to respond to them. 
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“In hybrid conflicts, armed forces are not a primary tool to exert 
military force: they rather serve as a means to create a scenario 
of intimidation. The idea of war as a struggle between two armies 
does not apply here. Consequently, military responses exercised 
by NATO forces are not the first or most appropriate security policy 
tool” (Major and Mölling 2015: 1). 
Military organization as an instrument of the national power should, 
therefore, be seen more and more as a means that has to be integrated 
with other instruments of power to respond adequately to challenges 
stemming from the hybrid warfare concept. 
As already described, hybrid warfare may affect various spheres of the 
life of a state or society. Countering such threats and challenges should 
be integrated, based on effective interaction among the various state 
bodies (i.e. ministries, governmental agencies and institutions, security 
agencies, and armed and law enforcement forces). Even more, “the 
multi-pronged hybrid threat demands that defence planners engage 
all parts of society in defensive efforts. Intergovernmental or interagency 
efforts are not enough any more” (Cederberg and Eronen 2015a: 2).
Prevention of hybrid threats requires a comprehensive understanding of 
the nature of the conflict in the contemporary international environment, 
including an awareness of the factors that affect its emergence 
and escalation, recognition of the stages of its development and 
conceptualization of potential ways towards conflict resolution. In Croatia, 
this capacity does not yet exist and is expected to be developed, to a 
certain degree, with the Homeland Security System Act (MoD Croatia 2016).
We argue that the concept of ways of responding to hybrid threats should 
comprise, at least, a continuous process of assessment of the vulnerability 
of national security (including the vulnerability of the vital societal 
functions):
Design of the processes and systems of the early warning, its setup 
and maintenance, based on an integrated (i.e. an inter-sectorial, 
a whole of government) approach.
Sustainability principles and practices in all three aspects 
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(economic, social and environmental) implemented in the 
state’s key policy and strategic documents to provide societal 
“immunity”.
Societal resilience developed and supported as a higher level 
of defence to ensure effective and efficient response to hybrid 
threats, as well as threats and challenges that usually belong to 
the scope of crisis management.
An integrated model of using/sharing all national capabilities—all 
available forces and the means to employ them efficiently and 
rationally.
The recommendations above require careful strategic planning and 
coordinated efforts on a societal level to be implemented successfully.
Strategic planning in the contemporary security 
environment
The traditional approach to strategic planning considers an organization 
through a set of fixed interests (goals, objectives) juxtaposed against a fixed 
environment (the world or a set of external conditions). This approach then 
assumes the development of a strategy for attaining the interests subject 
to the constraints of the fixed environment (Ascher and Overholt 1983: 6). 
In international politics, strategy is usually perceived as “a comprehensive 
way to try to pursue political ends, including the threat or actual use of 
force, in a dialectic of wills” (Heuser 2010: 27). This approach, however, 
orients the focus of strategy planning exclusively outwards and assumes 
the use of force as the exclusive means. The changing trends have 
already been recognized and some new approaches proposed: see, 
for example, Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998) regarding securitization 
and the concept of extended sectors of security.
In the complex security environment (Wijkman 2015), neither the 
environment itself nor the internal state of an organization (a nation) is fixed 
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and static. More importantly—and this specifically matters in the hybrid 
threat context—the internal state (the strength, cohesion vs vulnerabilities, 
etc.) directly relates to the ability to affect the environment, either in 
shaping it or in countering threats and dealing with disturbances. 
As the NATO STO (2017: 20) RST’s final report suggests, “it can be argued 
that when facing a competent hybrid threat actor, once the problem is 
recognized it is too late.” Therefore, it is important to be able to recognize 
the signs of hostile activities and combine data from many different sources 
to raise awareness, recognize, pre-empt, mitigate and respond to what 
may be very subtle activities. Moreover, although not the sole actor in the 
process, highly capable conventional military forces (including Special 
Operations Forces) remain a core component of national deterrence in 
a hybrid threat context.
This approach to strategic planning requires highly competent expertise 
and a highly developed strategic culture, which is another challenge, as 
well as an opportunity, for Croatia’s national defence. The fact that there 
is a gap of 15 years (i.e. 2002–2017) between the two national security 
strategies suggests that an advanced strategic culture, as well as strategy 
and policy development capacity, has yet to be built. 
Systems approach13
The more complex our environment is, the more indicators we have to 
watch to ensure we can have an appropriate answer to disturbances. 
Indicators link us to the world, since only by reading the right indicators 
can we cope with our dynamic environment (that is, be situationally 
aware). Indicators are also helpful in constructing an image of the state 
of our environment on which we can make a reliable decision to protect 
and promote what we hold dear.
13 In its most basic definition, a systems approach is “a line of thought in the management field which stresses the 
interactive nature and interdependence of external and internal factors in an organization” (WebFinance Inc. 2017).
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Hartmut Bossel (1996) argues that there are two basic sets of indicators 
needed for the system to cope with the challenges from the environment, 
determined by:
1. The system itself (the current state of the system).
2. The interests, needs, or objectives of the operator or observer. 
Arguably, the majority of national security strategies are focused on the 
second set (pursuing political ends), while the first (the system itself) is 
usually considered and analysed only regarding its capacity to achieve 
the ends described in the second. In fact, the first set should also comprise 
an assessment of the system itself, through the perspective of addressing 
vulnerabilities and weaknesses. We therefore propose the systems 
approach in designing and executing national strategic planning, which 
should encompass both sets of indicators. The systems approach (systems 
thinking) may arguably be very useful in handling the complexity facing 
nations and the world in the coming decades (Arnold and Wade 2015). 
The systems approach, in this context, enables the integration of ways and 
means, as well as internal and external environment of a state and society.
The role of society and societal resilience in 
defending against hybrid threats
In the hybrid threat environment, a society is, at the same time, an object 
of aggression and a force that counters aggression. As an object of 
aggression, it may be exposed to powerful informational, psychological, 
cultural and other aggressor influences. The aggressor can pursue 
its goals through influences, manipulation of public perception and 
destructive processes (supporting identity projects of a particular part 
of the population, inciting separatism and extremism, and/or provoking 
political and social destabilization) in the country attacked. Besides the 
cognitive and affective domain, an adversary may well intend to exploit 
existing socio-economic inequalities that lead to further social disruptions. 
Corruption of dependencies on the import of commodities and energy-
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generating products may also be a source of societal vulnerability. It is 
therefore critical to identify the causes of the state’s weaknesses and to 
implement policies to improve the situation to decrease negative impacts 
and develop ways to enhance resistance of such influences in various 
fields. This contributes to societal resilience against threats and challenges 
coming from the security environment, particularly against hybrid threats.
In general, as defined by Markus Keck and Patrick Sakdapolrak (2013), 
societal resilience comprises three capacities: coping, adaptive and 
transformative. Societal resilience tends to ensure that society can face 
and quickly recover from any disturbance and crisis.
Most definitions of resilience outline one or more perspectives, but comprise 
in general reactive recovery (e.g. the cyber-attack) and/or stability after 
traumatic events (e.g. natural disaster). We chose the description from 
Zebrowski (2016: 4) as the starting point:
“At its most general level, resilience is understood as the capacity to 
absorb, withstand and ‘bounce back’ quickly and efficiently from 
a perturbation. It is considered to be both a natural property and 
quality which can be improved within a broad array of complex 
adaptive systems including critical infrastructures, ecosystems, 
societies and economies through good governance.”
Societal resilience is not only a dynamic and relational concept but also a 
profoundly political one. It is a focus of the EU and, as stated in its Global 
Strategy (2016: 23), the resilience deals with “the ability of states and 
societies to reform, thus withstanding and recovering from internal and 
external crises”. Moreover, in the same document, building the “state and 
societal resilience to our East and South” is defined as one of the top five 
priorities for the EU’s external action. Besides references to resilience in 
the context of resilient societies, states and democracies, the EU Global 
Strategy (2016) also comprises the resilience of critical infrastructure, 
networks and services and the resilience of the EU’s democracies.
One important aspect of resilience is that it acknowledges uncertainty 
and complexity as a contemporary condition. However, it emphasizes 
internal capacities and capabilities as the way to deal with these 
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problems rather than external intervention (Juncos 2017). Resilience 
therefore encompasses more actors (e.g. civil preparedness, as is the 
case in NATO’s approach) and a broader spectrum of resources than 
a traditional, defence-related approach to national security. Some of 
the threats and challenges that should be taken care of in the societal 
resilience framework, relevant for Croatia, may be found in the following 
list adapted from MoD Finland’s Security Strategy for Society (2010) and 
Stoykov (2016):
• Political, economic and military pressure (from an external actor)
• Disturbances in critical government services
• Terrorism, radicalism and other criminality that endangers social 
order
• Severe disturbances in border security (including uncontrolled 
people movement)
• Major accidents and extreme natural phenomena
• Serious disturbances in health and welfare of the population
• Disturbances in energy supply
• Disturbances in power supply
• Disruptions in public utilities
• Disruptions in civil transportation systems and transport logistics
• Disturbances in financial and payment systems
• Disruptions in availability of public financing
• Disruptions in availability of food and water resources
• Disturbances in public information and communication systems
• Dealing with mass casualties
The list above comprises some of the most vital functions to society and is 
focused on contingencies. However, it does not contain all the challenges 
mentioned in the list of Croatia’s vulnerabilities, as some of them belong 
to cultural (e.g. structural corruption), legal (e.g. effectiveness of the legal 
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system) or economic (e.g. energy security) aspects. These issues are of 
particular importance as they may provide an exploitation opportunity 
for the hybrid adversary.
It is therefore important to define how societal resilience may become a 
means to counter hybrid threats. Some proposals, adapted from Yanakiev 
(2016) are given below.
• Dealing with unknown unknowns (“black swans”). This comprises the 
necessity to anticipate future circumstances, events or effects that 
are impossible to predict and plan for.
• Development of proactive government-led comprehensive 
approaches progressively accompanied by whole-of-society 
strategies aimed at managing risks and building a resilient society.
• Concentration of the resources and capabilities of different 
stakeholders (primarily the state’s instrument of power but also that 
of the society, the private sector and individual citizens) to counter 
hybrid threats. This includes improved public-private cooperation 
on security and development and modernization of civilian and 
military capabilities.
• Development of innovative legal concepts and frameworks to 
address hybrid threats adequately. 
• Expanding the missions of existing state institutions in the security 
sector (i.e. new authorities for intelligence and counterintelligence 
agencies and armed forces, boosting strategic communication) or 
creating new organizations. 
Conclusion and recommendations
A hybrid adversary seeks to exploit the weaknesses of society. It is 
therefore important to analyse vulnerabilities across all domains that 
might be exploited by an opponent, including legal, policy, diplomatic, 
information, military, economic, financial, intelligence, socio-cultural 
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and law enforcement. Such a gap analysis should also include legal 
vulnerabilities that could prevent the creation of an appropriate response 
to hybrid threats. A follow-up step is to reduce (societal) vulnerabilities and 
to develop joint contingency plans. Besides that, any relevant (grand) 
strategy should incorporate measures to reduce vulnerabilities that may 
be exploited by a potential hybrid adversary. The presented approach 
often requires political (e.g. policy) measures as well as some paradigm 
changes (e.g. cultural and structural adaptations). Therefore, awareness 
among decision-makers on the policy/strategic level should be raised that 
countering this type of threat and challenge requires not only different 
ways (strategies and concepts) and means (structures and organization), 
but also different qualities of an organization, be it a company (e.g. 
related to cyber threats), a community or a state.
Hybrid threat, as a potential, or hybrid warfare, as an act, is a complex 
phenomenon. It is complex as it results from the convergence and 
interconnection of different components which together form a more 
multifaceted and multidimensional threat. Complexity thus makes the 
traditional approach to strategic planning - which focuses exclusively 
on organizational interests (e.g. national values and interests) and the 
environment (e.g. global and regional security environment) - inadequate. 
With regard to means to respond to hybrid threats, while the traditional 
means (conventional armed forces) may still be valid as an instrument 
for ensuring territorial defence, protection of sovereignty and deterrence, 
they need to be used in conjunction with other state instruments of power 
to respond adequately to hybrid threats. Besides the state instruments 
of power, the resilience of the whole society (e.g. societal immunity) is 
needed to ensure deterrence against and response to hybrid threats.
This paper analyses hybrid warfare almost exclusively through the 
Western perspective since the scope of the research was to enlighten the 
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